

*Tactical*

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DCI/IC 74-0345  
5 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Tactical-National Intelligence Interface Study

From my visit today with Jerry Dyer, J-5 action officer on the subject:

a. The BUFF will be distributed on 6 March, comments are due by 14 March, and the Planners' conference is scheduled for 19 March.

b. The question whether or not to include SSN's and P-3's as "non-CDIP assets that contribute intelligence" is expected to be a major issue for the Planners. The paper now includes in the draft memorandum to the SecDef a list of intelligence assets organic to the combat forces that will not be reported to the IC Staff for the study. The rationale for excluding these assets is their total dedication to supported commands and nonavailability for national level tasking.

(Comment: If Navy wins the SSN/P-3 issue, it could result in other services moving to the "organic to combat forces" list assets that are now in the inventory to be provided to the IC Staff. The heart of the problem is cultural: the fear that once made visible at the national level, force support resources become subject to national level tradeoff decisions, and that national level tasking will diminish command control over supporting assets. The service action officers in effect diverted the purpose of the paper from the use to which intelligence and intelligence information could be put. They focused instead on categorizing intelligence

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
assets by the levels to which they are principally responsive. This is still further than the Services individually, or the JCS corporately, have ever before been willing to go, even within DOD. For the initial go-around, this gap is not serious. Most of the assets identified on the "organic to combat forces" list do not appear to have a significant capability to contribute to national intelligence needs. We should be able to get data on them after some of the cultural barriers are set aside.)

c. The action officers insisted on words that would allow the service, DIA and NSA representatives to participate in the IC Staff consideration of how non-CDIP ("tactical") assets could contribute to the national effort. (Although this was a defensive move, it should work to mutual advantage. It will give us direct access to data sources without going through JCS formalities, and should help allay service concerns about our motives.)

d. The use of CIRIS terms to identify the tasking of non-CDIP intelligence assets survived in the BUFF. As now written, the JCS will rely on the IC Staff to relate these tasks (CIRIS subject/geographic combinations) to the DCI objectives. (I saw no indication of preparation to address the national asset-operating command side of the study. At some point, the JCS are going to have to track U&S and component command  to the JCS objectives.)

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